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3. GROMYKO'S SPEECH BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

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[REDACTED]

In his opening speech to the UN General Assembly on 20 September, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's presentation of Soviet views on major problems contained no hints of any changes in the established lines of Soviet foreign policy, and the tone of his speech, while firm and at times touched with sarcasm, did not suggest any general shift toward a harder line.

The most noteworthy aspect of Gromyko's discussion of Middle East problems was his apparent effort to mobilize General Assembly support for recent Soviet diplomatic moves to forestall any foreign military intervention in Syria. He placed the Syrian situation in the context of the Suez crisis and called on the General Assembly to "make another useful contribution" by raising its "powerful voice in defense of the independence of other states" in the Middle East and by condemning Western actions in that area. He said that any General Assembly approval of the USSR's proposal for a four-power declaration renouncing the use of force and interference in the internal affairs of Middle East countries "might have an important salutary effect on the situation." It is probable that these remarks were designed to prepare the way for a formal Soviet resolution condemning alleged Western plotting against Syria and endorsing Moscow's call for a four-power declaration.

The USSR's confidence that it stands to score important propaganda gains in the General Assembly's debate on disarmament was reflected in Gromyko's stress on the need to broaden the membership of the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee and to conduct future negotiations "in an atmosphere of wide publicity." In an effort to bring greater pressure on the Western position and to stimulate General Assembly support for Soviet proposals for a first-step agreement, Gromyko proposed a five-year prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons in place of Moscow's previous insistence on a permanent ban. He repeated his 10 September strictures against aerial inspection and stated flatly that the West's final proposals at the London talks "cannot provide a basis for agreement."

[REDACTED]

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4. SITUATION IN THAILAND

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The selection of Pote Sarasin as Thailand's provisional premier pending elections in December has been made by the Sarit army group and the King in an apparent effort to emphasize that there is to be no change in Thailand's foreign policy. Pote, who is considered competent, was out of the country for five years prior to assuming his job as SEATO secretary general this summer, and thus managed to stay out of the bitter factional strife which led to the overthrow of the Phibun regime last week.

Pote's friendship for the United States and his close identification with SEATO may prove useful to the new regime in emphasizing the continuity of Thailand's pro-Western orientation and facilitating the regime's efforts to obtain international recognition.

Prior to his designation, Pote told Ambassador Bishop that he had agreed to have his name placed in nomination only on condition that there would be no change in Thailand's foreign policy and no pro-Communists in the cabinet.

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5. **INDONESIAN REGIONAL LEADERS DOUBTFUL OF
ANY RAPPROCHEMENT WITH DJAKARTA**

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Although Indonesian government officials are claiming that the recently concluded round-table conference to restore national unity was at least a "psychological" success, recent reports indicate that disaffected regional leaders remain highly skeptical of the conference's value.

Separatist leaders have described the results of the meeting as "generalities" and have expressed doubt that Djakarta will implement its promise to give the provinces a better political and economic deal. More specifically, they reportedly now feel that their chief demand--re-establishment of the Sukarno-Hatta partnership--is virtually impossible to achieve and are prepared to recast the issue in terms of demanding that Hatta eventually form his own government. In addition, these leaders are holding firm to their demands that the national council be transformed into a senate with strong legislative powers, that Communist influence be removed from the government, and that Chief of Staff Nasution be replaced.

An American observer who has just returned from Sumatra where he talked to high-ranking officials states that the next 60 to 90 days will be critical so far as the provinces' relations with the central government are concerned. He also reports that the dissident Sumatrans are considering a direct, high-level approach to the United States for assistance.

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6. BELGRADE OFFICIAL EXPLAINS YUGOSLAV POSITION ON BALKAN ENTENTE PROPOSAL

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[REDACTED] Franc Kos, a high-level Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official, told a US embassy officer in Belgrade that Tito's acceptance of the Rumanian proposal for a Balkan states meeting was purposely hedged with conditions which give him an out. Moreover, Kos, whom the embassy considers an informed and reasonably authoritative source, expects the Turks and Greeks to reject the invitation and feels that the Yugoslavs "certainly" did not plan to attend in their absence.

Kos feels that the timing of the invitation was designed by the Kremlin to detract attention from the recent Tito-Gomulka meeting and the Balkan pact which the Yugoslavs are determined to uphold. The US embassy officer believes that although Kos could not be drawn to the point of saying the Rumanian invitation was a Soviet or Rumanian trick, his remarks carried this clear implication.

Comment

Another Yugoslav official has said that the wording of Tito's reply to the Rumanian proposal was so general as to leave him a way out in the event the Greeks and Turks refused to accept the proposal. It is difficult to believe, however, that Tito was not well aware that the Turks and Greeks were almost certain not to accept it.

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